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Healthcare Coverage: A Comparative
Institutional Approach to Transgender
Healthcare Rights
Jennifer Wongi
At the bottom we ask, what of this body is mine to own?
What marrow remains after others have digested their fdl?
-Kris Gebhard, "Disordered Bodies," The Naked Eye'
The transgender community is one of the most underserved
and vulnerable populations in the American healthcare system.2
As is the case for many Americans, lack of insurance prevents
many transgender people from overcoming the increasing costs of
healthcare in general.' However, when it comes to health
insurance, some transgender individuals face a unique and often
insurmountable hurdle: the costs of transition-related healthcare.'
Transition-related healthcare includes the use of psychotherapy,
hormone therapy, and/or surgical procedures for treating the
psychological diagnosis of gender dysphoria." The overwhelming
t. I would like to acknowledge Professor Michele Goodwin for her inspiration
and support.
1. Kris Gebhard, Disordered Bodies, POEMS AND PSAs BLOG (Aug. 25, 2012),
http://krisgebhard.wordpress.com/2012/08/25/disordered-bodies/.
2. AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RES. & QUALITY, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND
HUM. SERVS., NATIONAL HEALTHCARE DISPARITIES REPORT 233 (2011) (discussing
healthcare disparities and identifying transgender people as one of the most
vulnerable populations).
3. JAMIE M. GRANT ET AL., NATL CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUAL., NAT'L GAY &
LESBIAN TASK FORCE, INJUSTICE AT EvERY TURN: A REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
TRANSGENDER DISCRIMINATION SURVEY 76 (2011) [hereinafter NTDS] ("Nineteen
percent . . . of the sample lacked any health insurance compared to 17% of the
general population.").
4. Id. at 77 (noting that high costs render care "inaccessible to most
transgender people"); Liza Khan, Transgender Health at the Crossroads: Legal
Norms, Insurance Markets, and the Threat of Healthcare Reform, 11 YALE J.
HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 375, 380 (2011) ("[Flinancial and health insurance
constraints may limit access to services. . . .").
5. WORLD PROF'L AsS'N FOR TRANSGENDER HEALTH, STANDARDS OF CARE FOR
THE HEALTH OF TRANSSEXUAL, TRANSGENDER, AND GENDER NONCONFORMING
PEOPLE 9-10 (7th ed. 2012) [hereinafter SOC] (documenting the most
comprehensive, current best practices for transgender health care).
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majority of medical authority has recognized transition-related
care as effective, medically necessary treatment for gender
dysphoria.6 Moreover, as the growing body of research on
transgender health indicates, most transgender individuals
receive some form of transition-related care at some point in their
lives.! Despite the importance and widespread usage of transition-
related care among transgender populations, however, almost all
individuals who obtain such care must pay unjustly burdensome
prices because the majority of insurance providers exclude
coverage for these services.' As a result, many transgender
individuals must forgo or limit the type and/or extent of care that
they need, or otherwise place themselves in financially dangerous
positions.! Despite recent expansions within the American
healthcare system,o critical disparities in care persist.
Applying a theory of comparative institutional analysis,n this
Note will examine transgender-inclusive healthcare coverage
under employment-sponsored insurance (ESI) plans. By
6. Id. at 5 (describing medical treatment options as "medically necessary for
many people"); Am. Med. Ass'n House of Delegates, Removing Financial Barriers to
Care for Transgender Patients, Res. 122 (A-08), at 1 (2008), available at
http://www.tgender.net/taw/ama-resolutions.pdf.
7. NTDS, supra note 3, at 77 ("Most survey respondents had sought or
accessed some form of transition-related care. Counseling and hormone treatment
were notably more utilized than any surgical procedures, although the majority
reported wanting to "someday" be able to have surgery.").
8. Kari E. Hong, Categorical Exclusions: Exploring Legal Responses to Health
Care Discrimination Against Transsexuals, 11 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 88, 96 (2002)
("Many private insurance companies exclude [sex reassignment surgery] and
hormone treatments from their coverage."). See also Khan, supra note 4, at 391-
401 (outlining the most common justifications insurers use to deny coverage as
denial of a pre-existing condition, denial of coverage for cosmetic procedures, and
denial of medical necessity).
9. As one transgender individual reported: "The transition and health care
has been expensive, all at a time where my main source of income (my law practice)
deteriorated. I have exhausted my savings and the equity from selling my home
just to pay medical and living expenses." NTDS, supra note 3, at 76.
10. In 2010, President Obama signed into law the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act. Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), amended by the
Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124
Stat. 1029 (2010) (to be codified in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.).
As key provisions become operative over the next couple of years, millions of
underinsured and uninsured Americans will gain access to quality, affordable
health services. CONG. BUDGET OFF., ESTIMATES FOR THE INSURANCE COVERAGE
PROVISIONS OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT UPDATED FOR THE RECENT SUPREME
COURT DECISION 3 (2012), available at
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/03-13-
Coverage%20Estimates.pdf.




examining the advantages and disadvantages of pursuing coverage
across various institutions-the market, the political process, and
the judicial system-this Note aims to shed light on which
institution or combination of institutions can best secure
affordable, equal access to transition-related procedures for
transgender populations. Part I will contextualize this analysis by
introducing these institutions and reviewing their role in shaping
the current picture of transgender health. This Part will also
present the theoretical framework for comparative institutional
analysis and explain its utility in advancing this debate. Part II
will apply this theoretical framework and explore the institutional
costs and benefits of using the market, the political process, and
the courts to secure transition-related benefits. Part III will
synthesize the strengths and weaknesses of these institutions and
discuss the impact of institutional decisions on the struggle for
transgender rights.
I. An Overview of Transgender Healthcare Rights
Across Institutions
While anti-transgender practices operate at all levels of the
healthcare delivery system," inaccessibility to medically necessary
transition-related care is one of the most contested, politicized,
and confusing pieces of this discriminatory picture. Problems
with access to this type of care tend to arise at two points. The
first point, which reflects ideological concerns, is medical
diagnosis." The process of obtaining eligibility for transition-
related care requires a diagnosis of gender dysphoria, which the
fourth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual for Mental
Disorders (DSM-IV) defines as "discomfort or distress that is
caused by a discrepancy between a person's gender identity and
that person's sex assigned at birth." As critics have argued, this
12. NTDS, supra note 3, at 72 (finding that transgender individuals faced
disrespect, harassment, violence, and outright denial of service "whether seeking
preventive medicine, routine and emergency care, or transgender-related services").
13. Dean Spade et al., Medicaid Policy & Gender-Confirming Healthcare for
Trans People: An Interview with Advocates, 8 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 497, 497 (2010)
("Gender-confirming healthcare for transgender people is widely misunderstood,
and some of the most popular misunderstandings are reflected in administrative
regulations.").
14. Psychiatric diagnoses are made according to the Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual for Mental Disorders. For a discussion on the politics of diagnosis, see, e.g.,
Judith Butler, Undiagnosing Gender, in TRANSGENDER RIGHTS 274 (Praisley
Currah et al. eds., 2006).
15. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
473
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requirement forces transgender individuals to subscribe to a
narrative of psychological disorder, which reinforces the
pathologization of gender variance and renders transition-related
care inaccessible to those who refuse to submit to a discourse of
mental illness.16 The second point, which reflects more material
concerns, is delivery of care. Once transgender individuals have
been diagnosed, they must find a medical professional who is
willing and able to provide treatment." Considering the fact that
transgender individuals tend to face outwardly hostile,
aggressively invasive, and/or exclusionary healthcare settings,"
this step can significantly restrict accessibility. Finally, even after
establishing eligibility and locating a provider, problems with
delivery often persist because many transgender individuals
cannot afford the costs of transition-related care."
Accordingly, efforts to secure transgender-inclusive
healthcare reflect both ideological and material concerns. With
regard to diagnosis, many activists have highlighted the need to
de-pathologize transgenderism and have recommended that the
medical community abandon mental disorder classification as a
prerequisite to care.20 With regards to delivery, a growing number
DISORDERS (4th ed. 2000). Although the DSM-IV uses "gender identity disorder,"
proposed revisions for the DSM-V refer to "gender dysphoria." See, e.g., Robert
Marvin, Proposed DSM-5 Revisions to Sexual and Gender Identity Disorder
Criteria, 12 AM. MED. AsS'N J. ETHICS 673, 673-77 (2010), available at
http://virtualmentor.ama-assn.org/2OlO/08/pdf/msocl-1008.pdf.; see also SOC, supra
note 5, at 5 ("A disorder is a description of something with which a person might
struggle, not a description of the person or the person's identity.").
16. Butler, supra note 14, at 275 ("To be diagnosed with gender identity
disorder is to be found, in some way, to be ill, sick, wrong, out of order, abnormal,
and to suffer a certain stigmatization as a consequence of the diagnosis being given
at all."); Dallas Denny, Transgender Communities, in TRANSGENDER RIGHTS, supra
note 14, at 184 (referring to terms such as "transsexual" and "gender dysphoria" as
"slave names"); Taylor Flynn, The Ties That (Don't) Bind, in TRANSGENDER RIGHTS,
supra note 14, at 36 ("[P]resenting sex from a medico-mental health model risks
pathologizing the lives and experiences of transgender individuals.").
17. According to the NTDS, "50% of the sample reported having to teach their
medical providers about transgender care." NTDS, supra note 3, at 76; see also J.
Denise Diskin, Taking It to the Bank: Actualizing Health Care Equality for San
Francisco's Transgender City and County Employees, 5 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY
L.J. 129, 135 (2008) ("Many ... have difficulty finding a doctor who is familiar and
comfortable providing primary health care services to a transgender person.").
18. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. To elaborate, consider the
following quote from an NTDS respondent: "I was forced to have a pelvic exam by a
doctor when I went in for a sore throat. The doctor invited others to look at me
while he examined me and talked to them about my genitals." NTDS, supra note 3,
at 74.
19. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
20. Butler, supra note 14, at 282; see also SOC, supra note 5, at 35 (addressing
474
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of sources have comprehensively documented the existence of
pervasive, anti-transgender discrimination within the medical
context,2 1 and such discrimination is now illegal in some
circumstances under federal law.22 Despite widely recognized
issues surrounding affordability, however, little progress has been
made to make transition-related care financially accessible to the
individuals who want and need it. This Note will advocate for
increased affordability by assessing how well various institutions
can achieve this goal.
A. The Current Picture: Market Dominance, Political
Inefficiency, and Judicial Inaction
Financial barriers to transition-related care persist because
political inefficiency and judicial inaction have made the market
the primary institutional decision-maker, even though the market
is a woefully inadequate institution for securing transgender-
inclusive benefits. Guided by economic principles, the majority of
public and private healthcare insurance plans specifically exclude
coverage for some or all transition-related services.23 Insurers
believe transgender-inclusive healthcare coverage is economically
unsound24 because they incorrectly assume all transgender
individuals always seek the most expensive transition-related
procedures.2 5 Furthermore, because only transgender people
the informed consent model).
21. NTDS, supra note 3, at 72.
22. For instance, under the ACA, § 1557, it is illegal for covered entities to deny
routine care to a patient on the basis of that person's transgender status. See infra
notes 170, 171 and accompanying text.
23. Hong, supra note 8, at 96 (discussing exclusion clauses under private
insurance plans); Nicole M. True, Removing the Constraints to Coverage of Gender-
Confirming Healthcare by State Medicaid Programs, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1329, 1340
(2012) ("State Medicaid programs typically deny coverage for treatments falling
under the last two stages of triadic therapy: hormone therapy and surgical
procedures."); Spade et al., supra note 13, at 500 ("No state's Medicaid regulations
explicitly include this care. Instead, twenty-eight states have no explicit
regulations regarding this care, and either accept or reject claims for
reimbursement on a case-by-case basis, while at least twenty-one states have
explicit regulations excluding coverage of this care.").
24. Hong, supra note 8, at 96 ("Insurance companies defend the exclusion
clause denying coverage . . . as a reasonable measure to contain costs and disallow
superfluous procedures.").
25. To the contrary, not all transgender individuals seek medical intervention
for transition procedures, and not all transgender individuals who seek
intervention seek all available types of care. See Khan, supra note 4, at 402
("[T]here is no one-size-fits-all treatment for gender variance."); Spade et al., supra
note 13, at 497; Health Insurance Discrimination for Transgender People, HUM.
RTs. CAMPAIGN, http://www.hrc.org/resources/entry/health-insurance-
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receive transition-related services,2 insurers do not have to run
the risk that these exclusions will alienate any significant portion
of their customer base.27
Political efforts to gain transition-related healthcare coverage
despite perceptions of unreasonably high economic risk remain
stunted by transphobic social norms.28 Due to widespread anti-
transgender bias, insurers can ignore studies that undermine the
validity of economic rationales," insist that transition-related care
is medically unnecessaryo despite medical authority that states
otherwise," and rest assured that such exclusions will elicit little,
if any, public admonition.32 Furthermore, political demands for
transgender-inclusive employment legislation have been
unsuccessful," and similar demands for transgender-inclusive
healthcare legislation have sidestepped the issue of transgender-
inclusive healthcare."
In turn, society's unwillingness to respond to transgender
discrimination-for-transgender-people (last visited Apr. 21, 2013) (countering
myths about the utilization of transition-related services).
26. To clarify, transition-related services refer to treatment for gender
dysphoria, and only transgender individuals receive diagnoses of gender dysphoria.
However, many cisgender individuals receive the same medical treatment for
different diagnoses. Insurers routinely cover hormone treatments for "menopause,
prostate cancer, and growth hormone deficiencies," as well as surgical procedures
like hysterectomies and breast reconstruction for women with breast cancer. Khan,
supra note 4, at 404-05.
27. Transgender population estimates range from .25% to one percent of the
population. NAT'L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUAL., UNDERSTANDING TRANSGENDER
1 (2009), available at http://transequality.org/Resources/NCTE
UnderstandingTrans.pdf.
28. Hong, supra note 8, at 100 (noting that transgender individuals lack the
"necessary political clout" to secure coverage under private healthcare plans "due to
the enormous social hostility they face"); Khan, supra note 4, at 388 (arguing that
gender variance "does not provoke the popular sympathy and support that more
common health conditions incite").
29. See infra Part II.B(i).
30. Khan, supra note 4, at 388, 391, 398-400.
31. See infra note 189.
32. Khan, supra note 4, at 378 (describing exclusions as "politically harmless"
for employers).
33. The Employment Non-Discrimination Act, first introduced in Congress in
1994, has remained stalled in the legislature. See Employment Non-Discrimination
Act (ENDA), NAT'L GAY & LESBIAN TASK FORCE,
http://www.thetaskforce.org/issues/nondiscrimination/ENDA-main-page (last
visited Nov. 10, 2012). For information about why federal legislation protecting
LGBT individuals in employment is necessary, see, e.g., Nat'l Ctr. for Transgender
Equal., ENDA by the Numbers, http://transequality.org/Resources/
enda-by-the numbers.pdf (last visited Apr. 22, 2013).
34. See infra Part II.B(ii).
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discrimination incites, and is incited by, judicial unwillingness to
name, prohibit, or remedy it." Indeed, legal challenges to both
public" and private insurance" exclusions have generally failed to
secure affordable, transgender-inclusive healthcare. Whereas
courts have handled state Medicaid exclusions as matters of state
legislation subject to federal restrictions," courts have simply
refused to handle exclusions in ESI plans altogether. Courts have
not only interpreted ESI exclusions as "bargained-for" terms under
contract law," but have also denied protection under civil rights
statutes because, until recently, courts did not consider
transgender discrimination to constitute discrimination on the
basis of sex.40 Transphobic exclusions in the realm of private
healthcare have thus essentially remained virtually untouchable
by law. As illustrated, economic, political, and judicial institutions
have so far failed to materially advance transgender equality with
regards to transition-related care.
B. Legal and Political Developments: Emerging
Institutional Shifts
Against the backdrop of these institutional failures, recent
35. See infra notes 39 and 40.
36. In the absence of state regulations excluding coverage, individuals have
been successful. See, e.g., Pinneke v. Preisser, 623 F.2d 546 (8th Cir. 1980); Doe v.
Minn. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 257 N.W.2d 816 (Minn. 1977). Under state
regulations excluding coverage, however, individuals have been unable to win
coverage. See, e.g., Smith v. Rasmussen, 249 F.3d 755, 761 (8th Cir. 2001). "[T]o
date, all of the courts that have been presented with an existing statutory or
regulatory prohibition on coverage ... have upheld the exclusionary provision and
affirmed the denial of coverage." True, supra note 23, at 1348.
37. Although these exclusions have been documented, it is important to realize
that compared to exclusions under public insurance, there is very little
documentation of denials from private insurers. See Hong, supra note 8, at 94.
38. See True, supra note 23, at 1341.
39. In the absence of exclusion clauses, claims for transition-related coverage
have been successful. See Davidson v. Aetna Life & Cas. Ins. Co., 420 N.Y.S.2d 450
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1979). Once exclusions are written into contracts, however, courts
have refused to compel coverage. Hong, supra note 8, at 99 ("[A]ny disputes
between a patient and her private insurer are a matter of contract law."). Although
this Note discusses judicial inaction in the age of transgender-specific exclusion
clauses, the ironic backstory is that the judicial act of favorable contract law
interpretation has spurred employers to author these clauses in the first place.
This is not to say that Davidson was decided incorrectly, but rather that perhaps
judicial action has stopped prematurely.
40. See, e.g., Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1984). For
an illustration of the expansion of "sex discrimination" under Title VII, see Cary
Franklin, Inventing the "Traditional Concept" of Sex Discrimination, 125 HARV. L.
REV. 1307 (2012).
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legal and political advancements have revealed potential
pathways to transgender-inclusive care. Within the legal system,
the concept of transgender discrimination as a form of actionable
sex discrimination-reified by numerous Courts of Appeals over
the past decade41-has emerged as a viable path to achieving
transgender rights. In Macy v. Holder,42 a transgender woman
named Mia Macy applied for a job as a ballistics technician at a
federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives
(ATF) laboratory in Walnut Creek, California.4 ' At the time of her
application, Macy presented as a man." Given her extensive
qualifications, ATF initially told her that the job was hers, but
subsequently offered the position to a cisgender45 candidate after
Macy informed ATF of her intent to transition into a female.
While ATF agreed to process Macy's sex discrimination claim
under Title VII, ATF argued that her "gender identity
stereotyping" claim was conceptually distinct and could not be
processed under Title VII.4 ' The EEOC held that ATF had
discriminated against Macy on the basis of her status as a
transgender person, and further held that discrimination based on
transgender status constituted impermissible discrimination on
the basis of sex under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
By opening the door for transgender employees to bring
discrimination claims under federal sex discrimination law, Macy
calls into question employment practices-like health insurance
exclusions-that solely disadvantage transgender employees. The
legal recognition of transgender people as a protected class means
that courts must intervene when employers engage in anti-
*49transgender discrimination.
41. See Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1317 (11th Cir. 2001); Smith v. City of
Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 575 (6th Cir. 2004); Rosa v. Park West Bank & Trust, 214
F.3d 213, 215 (1st Cir. 2000); Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1201 (9th Cir.
2000); Schroer v. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293, 305 (D.C. 2008).
42. 2012 WL 1435995 E.E.O.C. (2012).
43. Id. at *1.
44. Id.
45. Cisgender is a term used to describe people who generally identify as the
gender they were assigned at birth. Trans 101: Cisgender, BASIC RTS. OR. (Oct. 11,
2011), http://www.basicrights.org/uncategorized/trans-101-cisgender/.
46. Macy, 2012 WL 1435995 E.E.O.C. at *1-2 (2012).
47. Id. at *2-3.
48. Id. at *11.
49. See Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil Rights Tradition:
Anticlassification or Antisubordination, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 9, 22 (2003)
(explaining that Title VII applies to all employers and protects members of
protected classes from discrimination by their employers).
[Vol. 31:471478
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These legal expansions occur amidst a trend of positive,
though limited, developments established through the political
process. In the past decade, political pressures from interest
groups have encouraged a growing number of employers to elect
transgender-inclusive healthcare plans.50 In 2001, as a result of
lobbying and advocacy efforts, the City of San Francisco became
the first major U.S. employer to adopt a transgender-inclusive
healthcare plan for its employees." Between 2001 and 2004, the
city collected and produced data conclusively demonstrating the
low cost of transition-related benefits to employers." The
availability of this data has undoubtedly made some employers
more receptive to the idea of providing similarly inclusive
healthcare plans.3 In 2006, the Human Rights Campaign (HRC),
a national LGBT advocacy organization, began documenting the
accessibility of transgender-inclusive healthcare benefits in their
annual Corporate Equality Index (CEI) publications." Over the
years, the addition of this criterion has pushed many employers to
offer plans that cover transition-related benefits, as illustrated by
the following graph:"
50. Spade et al., supra note 13, at 500.
51. Diskin, supra note 17, at 129-30.
52. Id. at 159. For details on the data collection, see infra Part II.B.
53. The Human Rights Campaign publicizes this data to advocate for
transgender-inclusive healthcare. Transgender-Inclusive Benefits: Medical
Treatment Cost and Utilization, HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN,
http://www.hrc.org/resources/entry/transgender-inclusive-benefits-medical-
treatment-cost-and-utilization (last visited Dec. 1, 2012).
54. See HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN, CORPORATE EQUALITY INDEX 2006: A REPORT
CARD ON GAY, LESBIAN, BISEXUAL & TRANSGENDER EQUALITY IN CORPORATE
AMERICA (2006). Using a variety of criteria to assess workplace practices and
policies, the CEI rates large United States employers for LGBT inclusivity.
Corporate Equality Index, HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN, http://www.hrc.org/corporate-
equality-index/#.UKQyzmnwIWE (last visited Nov. 13, 2012).
55. All graphs are drawn from information available from the HRC. See
CORPORATE EQUALITY INDEX 2006, supra note 54; HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN,
CORPORATE EQUALITY INDEX 2008: A REPORT CARD ON GAY, LESBIAN, BISEXUAL &
TRANSGENDER EQUALITY IN CORPORATE AMERICA (2008); HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN,
CORPORATE EQUALITY INDEX 2009: A REPORT CARD ON GAY, LESBIAN, BISEXUAL &
TRANSGENDER EQUALITY IN CORPORATE AMERICA (2009); HuM. RTS. CAMPAIGN,
CORPORATE EQUALITY INDEX 2010: A REPORT CARD ON GAY, LESBIAN, BISEXUAL &
TRANSGENDER EQUALITY IN CORPORATE AMERICA (2010); HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN,
CORPORATE EQUALITY INDEX 2011: RATING AMERICAN WORKPLACES ON LESBIAN,
GAY, BISEXUAL & TRANSGENDER EQUALITY (2011); HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN,
CORPORATE EQUALITY INDEX 2012: RATING AMERICAN WORKPLACES ON LESBIAN,
GAY, BISEXUAL & TRANSGENDER EQUALITY (2012); HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN,
CORPORATE EQUALITY INDEX 2013: RATING AMERICAN WORKPLACES ON LESBIAN,
GAY, BISEXUAL & TRANSGENDER EQUALITY (2013). To be consistent with current
HRC naming practices that began in 2008, the 2007 data reflects data from the
480 Law and Inequality [Vol. 31:471
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Although most U.S. employers continue to offer plans that
contain blanket exclusions for transition-related care, the San
Francisco example and visible trends in segments of corporate
America shine some light on the efficacy of political processes in
the battle for transgender-inclusive healthcare.
C. The Analytic Framework: Comparative
Institutional Choice
In the wake of promising legal and political developments
arises an important question: what is the most efficient and
strategic way to proceed? Which alternative can best achieve-or
come closest to achieving-affordable, transgender-inclusive
healthcare: continued reliance on the market process, increased
political advocacy, or perhaps a Title VII lawsuit that could
undercut economic and politically discriminatory rationales?
Markets, political processes, and court systems alike have
strengths and weaknesses that could simultaneously help and
hinder the fight for transition-related care. In order to predict
2006 report.
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which path to action might produce the best results, this Note will
apply a theory of comparative institutional analysis to assess the
relative capabilities of each institution to achieve this goal.
At its core, "[clomparative institutional analysis begins with
an analysis of how institutions shape forms of economic
organization and the consequence of this for performance
outcomes."" The central focus of comparative institutional
analysis, which has been applied to numerous disciplines and
geographies," is the "duality of structure and agency."" More
specifically, because each institutional setting possesses unique
sets of rules and actors, 9 the setting-specific interactions between
rules and players will yield different results.' A comparison of
these interactions should therefore inform strategy. Several key
principles ground this analysis. First, actors influence institutions
through behavior and institutions mold actors through regulative,
normative, and cognitive pressures." Relatedly, neither actor
interests nor institutional pressures are exogenous or static
because both morph over a trajectory of dynamic tension.
Finally, while all institutions function well in ideal, "frictionless" 63
56. Glenn Morgan et al., Introduction, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE
INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 5 (Glenn Morgan et al. eds., 2010) [hereinafter CIA
HANDBOOK].
57. Id. at 7 (describing comparative institutional analysis' international focus
on the European and Asian contexts, as well as its research application across
areas "from politics to business and management to sociology").
58. Gregory Jackson, Actors and Institutions, in CIA HANDBOOK, supra note 56,
at 66.
59. Id.
60. Susan Freiwald, Comparative Institutional Analysis in Cyberspace, 14
HARv. J.L. & TECH. 569, 575 (2001) ("As a positive matter, the analysis predicts the
different outcomes that will arise in various institutional settings based on the
actors' incentives in each setting.").
61. Jackson, supra note 58, at 67; Gregory Jackson, Actors and Institutions, in
CIA HANDBOOK, supra note 56, at 76:
Regulative institutions are based on the making and enforcement of rules,
such as formal laws that regulate behaviour. Normative institutions are
rooted in collective moral understandings about legitimate behaviour.
Cognitive institutions are those based on taken-for-granted definitions of
the situation and worldviews. These categories are analytically distinct,
and imply different mechanisms of institutionalization and carriers of
institutional effects. Empirically, however, institutions may be
underpinned by all three dimensions to various degrees.
Id.
62. Id. ("While the parameters of an institution appear as exogenous and fixed
to actors in the short-term, they must be considered variable in the long run.").
683. NEIL K. KOMESAR, LAW'S LIMITS: THE RULE OF LAW AND THE SUPPLY AND
DEMAND OF RIGHTS 22 (2001):
It will not do to compare a real world, highly imperfect adjudicative
482 Law and Inequality [Vol. 31:471
contexts, high numbers and high complexity consistently result in
low institutional performance;64 institutions "move together'6  in
the sense that factors that increase or decrease performance tend
to do so across the board. Comparative institutional analysis thus
helps us select the best option from a range of "bad or unattractive
alternatives.""
In his book, Law's Limits: The Rule of Law and the Supply
and Demand of Rights, Professor Neil Komesar sets forth a
participation-centered model of comparative institutional analysis
that ties institutional performance with "the pattern of
participation of important . . . actors common to all the
institutions."6 ' The "central tenet" of this approach is that social
policy goals depend upon the participation of interested parties,
and that parties will participate in furthering a goal only when the
benefits of participation outweigh its costs." Participation benefits
relate to "the distribution of benefits or stakes across the relevant
populations." Conversely, participation costso relate to the costs
of organizing action and disseminating information, which
increase significantly when actors are numerous and issues are
complex." Here, it is critical to recognize the dynamism between
institutions and actors noted above; while actor participation
dictates institutional change, the rules and procedures of
institutions control participation.72 Based on this approach,
process with a frictionless political process. Like the frictionless market
and the frictionless adjudicative process, a frictionless political process is
an obvious solution. But it is also an unavailable solution. Like all real-
world institutions, the political process is never frictionless.
Id.
64. Id. at 21-22 (observing that the market, judicial system, and political
process deteriorate at high numbers and high complexity).
65. Id. at 23.
66. Id. at 24.
67. Id. at 30. This approach turns "an eye toward making significant
contributions to public policy debates." Freiwald, supra note 60, at 575.
68. Freiwald, supra note 60, at 575-76. If informational and organizational
costs outweigh the benefits of a favorable outcome, actors cannot participate or
advocate for their interests. Id. at 576.
69. KOMESAR, supra note 63, at 30.
70. Transaction costs in the market, litigation costs in court, or political
participation costs. Id. -
71. Id.
72. KOMESAR, supra note 63, at 31 ("[Ilnstitutional economists believe that
economic activity is a function of transaction costs and that transaction costs are a
function of laws, rules, and customs."); Freiwald, supra note 60, at 577
("[I]nstitutions themselves create their own costs that affect whether a given
institution will adequately take account of all interests.").
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comparative institutional analysis is significant because it
illustrates how the delegation of institutional responsibility
impacts the allocation of individual rights."
This type of analysis is useful here because the topic of
transgender healthcare presents a complex intersection of health,
employment, and civil rights issues that no institution has
successfully grasped. The failure to arrive at a just solution for
this issue relates to the high number of interested actors against
coverage, the low number of interested actors in favor of coverage,
and the complexity of the issue at hand. At a minimum,
transgender-inclusive ESI plans implicate virtually all employers,
the health insurance providers with which they contract, and all
transgender and cisgender employees who help bear the cost of
group health plans. Professor Komesar notes that high numbers
may be particularly detrimental to institutional performance when
"transactions have serious effects on others not party to the
transaction."" In this case, employers transact with insurance
companies to purchase exclusionary ESI plans that deny
transgender employees the option for medically necessary
coverage. Although transgender employees are the individuals
most harmed by these transactions, they remain voiceless because
their small population size prevents them from realistically
influencing employer decisions.
This issue is complex because of the procedural nuances
inherent in American health insurance systems and the political
and moral judgments that transgender-inclusive care implicates.
Technical difficulties such as the interplay between state and
federal management of health insurance, variations across
individual, small-group, and large-group markets, and the future
repercussions of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) make questions
about content regulation challenging to address. In addition,
Professor Komesar observes that less mechanical, more ideological
complexities, such as "concerns about aesthetics or community
values," may equally frustrate institutional performance.
Transgender-specific healthcare exclusions involve more than
economic rationales; socially engrained views about the intrinsic
73. KOMESAR, supra note 63, at 20 ("[Vlariation in institutional choice dictates
variation in law and rights.").
74. Id. at 25.
75. See Amy B. Monahan, The ACA, the Large Group Market, and Content
Regulation: What's a State to Do?, 5 ST. Louis U. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 83, 86-92
(2011) (problematizing issues of content regulation under the ACA).
76. KOMESAR, supra note 63, at 25.
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nature of biological sex characteristics" and the rigidity of the
gender binary turn transition-related healthcare into a site of
moral contestation." These cisgender norms complicate
determinations of medical necessity, the role of employer
responsibility, and the exercise of transgender autonomy.
Taking Professor Komesar's approach to comparative
institutional analysis, this Note will explore how well the market
(the current model), the political process (the emerging model),
and the judicial system (the potential future model) work to
achieve the goal of transgender-inclusive healthcare under ESI
plans. By comparing the strengths and weaknesses of
institutional structures and the costs and benefits of actor
participation within each context, this Note aims to discern which
institution can effectively secure transition-related benefits.
Ultimately, this Note serves to strategize future efforts by
contextualizing the consequences of the status quo, political and/or
legislative (in)action, and judicial intervention.
D. A Note on Diagnosis and the Importance of
Transition-Related Care
This section will preface the analysis with two contextual
points. The first is that aside from insurance coverage and
financial accessibility, there remain other significant hurdles to
transgender-inclusive healthcare. Problematizing affordability
issues does not directly address the stigma inherent in requiring a
mental disorder diagnosis for transition-related care.7 ' However,
concerns about the medically imposed framework of eligibility
should not necessarily preclude efforts to increase financial
accessibility once this problematic eligibility has been granted.
"[I]f the diagnosis is now the instrument through which benefits
and status can be achieved, it cannot be simply disposed of
without finding other, durable ways to achieve those same
results."o Improving affordability within the current system
remains imperative, insofar as no such other, durable method
exists. Admittedly, because points of inaccessibility to
77. Anne C. DeCleene, The Reality of Gender Ambiguity: A Road Toward
Transgender Health Care Inclusion, 16 L. & SEXUALITY 123, 131-33 (2007)
(referring to the "God" method).
78. Dean Spade, Compliance Is Gendered, in TRANSGENDER RIGHTS, supra note
14 at 228 (referring to "rigidly defined and harshly enforced understandings of
binary gender").
79. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
80. Butler, supra note 14, at 280.
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transgender-inclusive healthcare function together, advocating for
access within the current framework necessarily runs the risk of
implicitly legitimizing its mechanics."
The second point is that affordability matters because
transition-related care can be life-changing and even life-saving
for many transgender individuals.8 2 Although not all transgender
individuals wish to obtain transition-related healthcare, ensuring
accessibility to this type of care can have significant individual,
social, and systemic benefits. These benefits, however, are largely
contextual, in that they relate directly to the individual, social,
and systemic costs of gender variance in a violently cisgender
society." On an individual level, transgender populations face
disturbingly high rates of individual suffering and self-harm;"
according to the National Transgender Discrimination Survey
(NTDS), forty-one percent of all respondents had attempted
suicide." Transgender populations also experience high levels of
violence by others.86 For example, the NTDS reports that
transgender populations face elevated levels of physical assault
(thirty-five percent)," harassment, mistreatment, or
discrimination in employment (ninety percent)," and harassment
in education (seventy-eight percent)," and places of public
accommodation (fifty-three percent);o and denial of services in
housing (nineteen percent)' and healthcare (nineteen percent).9 2
81. Id.
82. NTDS, supra note 3, at 77.
83. See, e.g., Nat'l Ctr. for Transgender Equal., Ending Anti-Transgender
Violence, available at http://transequality.org/Resources/NCTEBlueprint-for_
Equality20l2_EndingViolence.pdf (last visited Apr. 22, 2013) (detailing the extent
of anti-transgender violence).
84. Anne A. Lawrence, Transgender Health Concerns, in THE HEALTH OF
SEXUAL MINORITIES 491-92 (Ilan H. Meyer & Mary E. Northridge eds., 2007)
(finding that transgender individuals "appear to be at increased risk for completed
suicide, suicide attempts, and other forms of self-harm").
85. NTDS, supra note 3, at 82. The average rate for attempted suicide in the
United States is 1.5%. Id.
86. By violence, I mean physical violence and non-physical forms of
discrimination like harassment and bullying. "The attempt to split bias from
violence has been this society's most enduring and fatal rationalization." PATRICIA
WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 61 (1992). A broader understanding
of violence helps us think more critically about the ways in which social forces
prevent transgender people from accessing opportunities.
87. NTDS, supra note 3, at 3.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 5.
91. Id. at 4.
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Finally, transgender populations face systemic forms of violence as
well. Transgender populations face disproportionately high levels
of incarceration" and homelessness," and may be unable to obtain
identification documents that match their lived gender." Often,
violence stems from overlapping personal, societal, and systemic
forces.
Transition-related healthcare has the potential to help
alleviate many forms of violence. Personally, transition-related
care may empower transgender individuals who require medical
facilitation to fully realize their lived gender, and this sense of
physical, emotional, and spiritual congruence can have positive
health outcomes." Perceived congruence between bodily and
performative gender by others may also reduce levels of violence
within society.97 Furthermore, utilization of gender-confirming
medical care has provided grounds for legal recognition and
issuance of updated identification documents." Taken together,
individually experienced, socially perceived, and systemically
acknowledged congruence between expressed and documented
gender identity works to open various economic opportunities to
transgender populations."
At the outset, this view of gender-confirming care is largely
illusory because it presents medically facilitated gender
conformance as a solitary solution, and it portrays a falsely linear
progression of overlapping, often cyclical events.'o Gender
conformance is not a solution to ending anti-transgender violence
92. Id. at 6.
93. NTDS, supra note 3, at 163 (statistics for incarceration "exceed those of the
general population for prisons, in some cases by many times").
94. Id. at 107 ("1.7% of the sample responded that they were currently
homeless or living in a shelter, which is nearly double the percentage that the
National Coalition for the Homeless estimates for the U.S. population."); id. at 112
(reporting that nineteen percent of respondents reported homelessness "as a result
of discrimination or family rejection based on gender identity," which is "2.5 times
higher than the general population lifetime rate of homelessness").
95. Seventy-nine percent of respondents had not updated all of their
documents; thirty-three percent were unable to update any documents. Id. at 5.
96. Transition-related care can "maximize [transgender individuals'] overall
health, psychological well-being, and self-fulfillment." SOC, supra note 5, at 1.
97. For instance, gender conformance decreases violence within healthcare
settings. NTDS, supra note 3, at 75.
98. Spade, supra note 78, at 228.
99. Id. at 217-18 (discussing the gendered nature of economic coercion).
100. Lawrence, supra note 84, at 642 ("Trans-people are subjected to both
interpersonal and structural prejudice and discrimination, which in practice are
very difficult to disentangle.").
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or discrimination, but "[t]he isolating of only some of these
processes for critique, while ignoring others, is a classic exercise in
domination."'o Gender-confirming healthcare also cannot open
economic opportunities if a lack of economic opportunities bars
individuals from obtaining such care. Furthermore,
understanding gender conformance as merely a remedial response
to violence hinders understanding medically facilitated transitions
as acts of autonomy and self-determination. 0' With these
shortcomings in mind, however, outlook may help conceptualize
the role that gender-confirming healthcare can play at individual,
social, and institutional levels in order to illuminate why ensuring
its availability is a crucial component of securing transgender
rights.
II. A Comparative Institutional Analysis of
Transgender Healthcare Rights: Weighing the Costs
and Benefits of Economic, Political, and Legal
Participation
A. The Market: The Current Model
Except for the recent and limited institutional shifts
discussed below, market processes have governed transition-
related coverage under ESI plans since exclusion policies became
the norm.o' The historic inability of political processes to support
transgender health,'04 combined with judicial unwillingness to
intervene, has made the market the default institutional choice for
determining the right to transition-related care. It is important to
recognize that this relegation of decision-making still constitutes
an institutional choice that implicates structural and participatory
costs and benefits. As this Section will explain, the procedural
limitations of free market principles and the inability of
transgender employees to exercise consumer rights have resulted
in a virtual bar to transition-related services. These costs make
market regulation antithetical to the goal of healthcare equality.
101. Dean Spade, Dress to Kill, Fight to Win, LTTR,
http://1ttr.org/journal/l/dress-to-kill-fight-to-win (last visited Nov. 5, 2012).
102. Id. (countering the assumption that transition-related surgery has a single
meaning).
103. See Davidson v. Aetna Life & Cas. Ins. Co., 420 N.Y.S.2d 450 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1979).
104. See Spade, supra note 78, at 228-33 (identifying the limits of the "gay
rights" agenda).
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1. The Structural Costs and Benefits of the Market
In theory, the key institutional benefit of the free market is
its ability to make virtually all products available."o' Therefore,
under market principles, goods that are unpopular-for instance,
transgender-inclusive healthcare plans-will remain available for
consumption as long as consumer demand exists.'" As the absence
of transition-related coverage demonstrates, however, some
products remain unavailable for purchase despite demands.
Relatedly, Professor Komesar notes that the "miracle of the
market" occurs only when actors can transact independently, thus
allowing "the atomistic forces of competition to deliver goods and
services from many to many.'.o. When participation costs prevent
actors from exercising consumer autonomy, a system that
conditions product availability on the bargaining power of
consumers perpetuates exclusion, turning the theoretical benefit of
non-regulation into a cost.08 Although blanket exclusions for
transition-related care constitute legally "bargained-for" terms of
employment contracts, employees rarely have the power to bargain
for terms of coverage: individual employees are generally stuck
with the insurance carriers and plans selected by their
employers,' and "individual consumers simply do not have the
power to force a multi-million dollar company to change any terms
of the blanket policy it offers to thousands, if not millions, of
customers.,"o Furthermore, in this case, bargaining power
implicates not simply the willingness to pay more, but the
willingness to accept employment. The institution of the market
thus imposes severe costs to the goal of transition-related care.
2. The Costs and Benefits of Market Participation
The current bar to coverage for transition-related care
reflects unequal levels of participation between employers and
employees. For employers, the primary benefit of participating in
105. KOMESAR, supra note 63, at 27.
106. Id. at 27-28 ("Pro-market proponents can claim this informal world [of
market transactions] as their own because it shows that individuals can
imaginatively and creatively operate outside of legislatures, bureaucracies, and
courts.").
107. Id. at 25.
108. Id. at 28 (noting that people skeptical of the market "see these informal
settings as indicative of the power of cooperation and the real possibility of
communitarian activity").
109. Khan, supra note 4, at 394.
110. Hong, supra note 8, at 100.
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market transactions that exclude coverage is the freedom to avoid
paying insurance claims for transition-related care."
Theoretically, the costs of employer participation in such an
institution might include the loss of potential consumers who
could help spread insurance risks, 2 or the loss of labor to
competitors if maintaining employment contracts with
transgender employees constituted a material business interest."'
However, due to the small number of transgender employees in
American workplaces, the risks of labor losses are negligible."'
Furthermore, employers tend to assume that individuals with
gender variance will always seek medical intervention;" that
treatment for these conditions would be radically expensive and
burdensome for the company;" and that extending this type of
care would attract a flood of transgender individuals who would
enroll to exploit these benefits."' The determination that
transgender populations lack an "insurable interest""' as high-risk
consumers thus negates the risks of losing cost-spreading
insurance consumers. Because the benefits significantly outweigh
the costs, market participation is possible for employers.
In contrast, the oppressive transaction costs for transgender
employees render participation impossible. Although transgender
employees have immeasurably high stakes in securing the freedom
to purchase medically necessary healthcare, these benefits cannot
offset the organizational and informational costs of individual
participation. On the organizational side, small numbers impede
establishing a significant demand for transgender-inclusive
111. Khan, supra note 4, at 389 ("It is not difficult to see why health insurers
operating in an unregulated, competitive market would be inclined to exclude
transition-related care from their list of covered benefits."). But see Hong, supra
note 8, at 97 (insisting that this benefit is a pretext for discrimination because some
employers elect coverage).
112. See Monahan, supra note 75, at 91 (discussing cost efficiencies of health
insurance in the group market).
113. As the HRC CEI has shown, publicaly demonstrating a commitment to
diversity is a material business interest. See supra Part II.B(i).
114. Diskin, supra note 17, at 139 ("[It is far more rare to find employers willing
to financially invest in policies that increase workplace equality."). The exception
is when the loss of transgender labor is tied to larger issues of LGBT equality. In
these instances, the true cost is not the risk of losing transgender labor itself, but
the risk that failing to satisfy a commitment to LGBT equality will threaten
economic success. In general, these costs only seriously arise for large employers.
See supra Part II.B(ii).
115. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
116. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
117. Khan, supra note 4, at 389 (referring to the "moral hazard problem").
118. Id. at 388.
Law and Inequality
healthcare; on the informational side, the difficulty of educating
reluctant employers about the importance of coverage impedes
justifying a supply. For transgender employees, the high costs of
participation thus relate directly to the structural constraints of
bargaining for diffuse interests. 9  Although some insurance
carriersl' offer transgender-inclusive healthcare plans,
transgender employees cannot afford to participate in the
transaction process because the costs of influencing employer
purchases as individuals are impossibly high.
B. The Political Process: The Emerging Model
In some circumstances, activists have had some success in
shifting the regulation of transition-related care under ESI plans
from market forces to the political process. The political process
has illustrated significant structural advantages, which include
the capacity to question and contradict "neutral" financial costs,
the power of group representation, and the ability to present
coverage optimistically as a benefit to employers and employees
alike. Conversely, the political process also poses structural
disadvantages due to its reliance on employer goodwill, its unequal
influence based on employer size, and its inability to articulate
complex forms of discrimination. Although the costs and benefits
of political participation often parallel the costs and benefits of
market participation, the political process may equalize the
burdens of participation between employers and employees in
some cases.
1. The Structural Benefits of the Political Process
One major institutional benefit of the political process is its
capacity to address inequalities in the market.'2 1 Under market
principles, employer assumptions about the costs of coverage are
assumed to reflect realities in supply and demand, and thus
remain unchecked. In the political process, however, appeals to
119. Freiwald, supra note 60, at 577 ("The ability of market transactions to
resolve conflicts involving diffuse interests depends on whether the transaction
costs involved exceed the benefits. Those benefits correspond to the participants'
stakes in the outcome.").
120. HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN, TRANSGENDER-INCLUSIVE HEALTH CARE COVERAGE
AND THE CORPORATE EQUALITY INDEX 15-16 (2012) [hereinafter HRC COVERAGE]
(providing a list of major insurance carriers that administer coverage under at least
one plan).
121. Spade, supra note 78, at 230 (documenting the growth of the transliberation
movement and its potential to address the economic oppression of capitalism).
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social justice may allow dedicated interest groups to question the
validity and fairness of these assumptions.'22 Indeed, transgender
activists have utilized the political process to challenge the
assumption that insurance coverage would automatically result in
insurmountable economic burdens for the employer. In 2001, the
City of San Francisco became the first major American employer
to provide transgender-inclusive healthcare to its employees."'
Lobbying from transgender activists between 1996 and 2001
provided the impetus for these inclusive changes.'24 Significantly,
the political process through which the city secured these
employee benefits produced a paper trail of financial statistics.
Originally, opponents of expanded coverage feared that
transgender people would "flock""' to the city for expensive sex
change procedures, and the city projected that in the first year,
thirty-five individuals would claim transition-related benefits for a
total annual cost of $1.75 million.'26 In fact, in the first three
years, the city spent only $182,374.33 on eleven claims. 27 By
pushing the City of San Francisco to confront the economic
unreasonableness of exclusion, political pressures helped to
counter false assumptions about the true costs of such care,'2 ' and
influenced some employers to adopt more trans-inclusive policies.
Secondly, the political process allows members of socially
unpopular minority groups to gain visibility and power through
broader group representation.'29 In the case of transgender-
inclusive healthcare, the HRC's CEI provides a clear example. As
122. See, e.g., Transgender Inclusive Benefits: Medical Treatment Cost and
Utilization, HUM. RTs. CAMPAIGN, http://www.hrc.org/resources/entry/transgender-
inclusive-benefits-medical-treatment-cost-and-utilization (last visited Dec. 1, 2012).
123. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
124. Diskin, supra note 17, at 155-58 (documenting the efforts of transgender
activists in 1996 and again in 2001).
125. Id. at 155.
126. Id. at 154.
127. Id. at 159. For a more detailed breakdown, see San Francisco Transgender
Benefit: Actual Cost & Utilization (2001-2006), HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN
http://www.hrc.org/resources/entry/san-francisco-transgender-benefit-actual-cost-
utilization-2001-2006 (last visited Nov. 7, 2012).
128. The HRC notes that "[a]ccording to businesses reporting to the HRC
Foundation, making these benefits accessible comes at an overall negligible cost to
their overall health insurance plans." HuM. RTS. CAMPAIGN, CORPORATE EQUALITY
INDEX 2013: RATING AMERICAN WORKPLACES ON LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL AND
TRANSGENDER EQUALITY 28 (2012).
129. KOMESAR, supra note 63, at 60-61 (explaining minoritarian and
majoritarian bias). But see Spade, supra note 78, at 230 (arguing that agendas
determined by elite members of interest groups cannot achieve meaningful change
for more vulnerable members, and advocating for increased self-determination).
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discussed above, the HRC began indexing data on transition-
related benefits in the CEI 2006 report.3 o Under Criterion 2c, the
new transgender health criterion, survey respondents received five
points if they provided at least one transgender-inclusive health
benefit-counseling, hormone therapy, hormone therapy
monitoring, surgical sex reassignment procedures, or short-term
disability leave for surgical sex-reassignment procedures-without
exclusion."' An employer could thus receive credit for offering
"transgender-inclusive benefits" even if they retained exclusions
for hormone therapy and surgical procedures.'" The chart below
illustrates the breakdown of transgender-inclusive benefits
provided by all employees who fulfilled Criterion 2c'. in the
criterion's first five years:
130. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
131. HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN, CORPORATE EQUALITY INDEX 2006: RATING AMERICAN
WORKPLACES ON LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL AND TRANSGENDER EQUALITY 7-8 (2006).
132. Recall, as discussed above, that a mental health diagnosis of gender
dysphoria is generally required to establish eligibility for hormone therapy or
surgical procedures. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. While mental
health benefits are important, it should be noted that this type of benefit would not
actually cover any aspect of the medical transition itself. To be sure, this type of
benefit would cover not only therapy for diagnosis, but also any further therapy for
the treatment of gender dysphoria. Interestingly, covering mental health services
for gender dysphoria without covering physical transition-related benefits may
reflect a common, underlying belief that gender variance is exclusively a
psychological issue and that physical transitions are medically unnecessary.
133. The information composing this graph is drawn from the HRC's Corporate
Equality Index Reports from 2007-2011. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
Refer to the chart in Part I to see the percentage of employers who offered
transgender-inclusive healthcare. That chart does not reflect percentages of
employers who simply fulfilled Criterion 2c. Rather, it reflects percentages of
employers who offered transgender-inclusive healthcare benefits without exclusion.
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A Breakdown of Transgender-
Inclusive Services Offered by
Employees Covering at Least One
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Evidently, the majority of employers who fulfilled Criterion
2c did not cover any physical aspect of transition-related care.
Beginning with the CEI 2012 report, however, the HRC tightened
requirements for Criterion 2c. 4 Under these new requirements,
employers received ten points for satisfying Criterion 2c only if
they offered at least one health insurance plan that 1) covered all
medically necessary transition-related care, and 2) conformed to
current medical standards of care for eligibility determinations.'3 5
Although the HRC had been announcing these upcoming changes
134. HuM. RTS. CAMPAIGN, CORPORATE EQUALITY INDEX 2012: RATING AMERICAN
WORKPLACES ON LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL AND TRANSGENDER EQUALITY 13 (2012).
135. Id. at 13.
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since 2009,136 the heightened requirements resulted in a dramatic
decrease in the number of survey participants who fulfilled
Criterion 2c: seventy-nine percent"' of respondents received credit
in the 2011 report, but only thirty-three percent1'3 received credit
in the 2012 report. Despite this percentage drop, the actual
number of employers offering transition-related benefits more
than doubled, from 85 in 2011 to 207 in 2012.'39
These statistics reveal two important lessons about the power
of group representation in the political process. The first is that
when influential community groups like the HRC advocate on
behalf of transgender populations within their ranks, they may
successfully win material benefits that transgender populations,
acting alone, could not.o By incorporating transgender-inclusive
benefits into the CEI, the HRC communicated to large employers
that these benefits constituted an integral part of LGBT workplace
equality."' The increasing number of employers who have elected
to fulfill Criterion 2c in response to its inclusion indicates that
some employers are willing to offer transgender-inclusive care to
affirm their commitment to this vision of equality.'42 Moreover,
136. Id. at 12.
137. HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN, CORPORATE EQUALITY INDEX 2011: RATING AMERICAN
WORKPLACES ON LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL AND TRANSGENDER EQUALITY 26 (2011).
138. HuM. RTS. CAMPAIGN, CORPORATE EQUALITY INDEX 2012: RATING AMERICAN
WORKPLACES ON LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL AND TRANSGENDER EQUALITY 28 (2012).
Tellingly, the HRC has dedicated a webpage to explaining (and, in part, justifying)
its refusal to give credit for mental health services alone. Corporate Equality
Index: Does It Give Credit for Therapy, HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN,
http://www.hrc.org/resources/entry/corporate-equality-index-does-it-give-credit-for-
therapy (last visited Nov. 29, 2012).
139. HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN, CORPORATE EQUALITY INDEX 2012: RATING AMERICAN
WORKPLACES ON LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL AND TRANSGENDER EQUALITY 28 (2012).
For an important distinction, see supra note 133 and accompanying text.
140. See HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN, TRANSGENDER-INCLUSIVE HEALTH CARE
COVERAGE AND THE CORPORATE EQUALITY INDEX 3 (2012), available at
http://www.hrc.org/files/assets/resources/TransgenderHealthcare_- WhitePaper_4.
pdf (last visited Dec. 1, 2012) ("Up until the last few years, nearly all U.S.
employer-based health insurance plans contained 'transgender exclusions' that
limited insurance coverage for transition-related treatment and other care, but this
is changing.").
141. Id. at 14 ("Transgender-inclusive health coverage is part of equal
compensation, specifically equal benefits.").
142. For evidence that companies pride themselves on CEI scores, see, e.g.,
Cigna Scores 100% on Human Rights Campaign's Corporate Equality Index, DAILY
FIN., Nov. 14, 2012, http://newsroom.cigna.com/NewsReleases/cigna-scores-100--on-
human-rights-campaign-s-corporate-equality-index.htm; Comcast Is One of
America's Best Employers for Gay Workers, PHILLY POST, Nov. 14, 2012,
http://blogs.phillymag.com/the-philly-post/2012/11/14/comcast-americas-places-
work-gay-people/; Diageo Recognized by Human Rights Campaign as "Best Place to
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the fact that heightened requirements resulted in a significant
percentage drop in the number of employers who received credit
for Criterion 2c, but nevertheless produced a substantial increase
in the number of employers who offered all transgender-inclusive
benefits, illustrates the strength of political influence. Because
companies can use high CEI scores to promote themselves as
diverse, inclusive employers,143 the HRC can effectively bargain for
more transgender-inclusive benefits by raising the bar to Criterion
2c credit. When the HRC demands transgender-inclusive
healthcare as part of its demand for broader LGBT equality,
employers-especially those who have expressed their
commitment to LGBT equality with perfect CEI scores in the
past-have incentive to meet these demands.4 4
The second lesson is that because community groups like the
HRC have a sizeable audience, the HRC can use its influence to
counter social myths about the "elective" or "cosmetic" nature of
transition-related care." By requiring that eligibility
determinations for transition-related care comport with Standard
of Care standards of medical necessity,"'4 the HRC legitimizes such
Work" for Fifth Year in a Row, PRNEWSWIRE, Nov. 14, 2012,
http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/diageo-recognized-by-human-rights-
campaign-as-best-place-to-work-for-fifth-year-in-a-row-179296891.html; DTCC
Named a "Best Place to Work" by Human Rights Campaign, Bus. WIRE, Nov. 14,
2012, http://finance.yahoo.com/news/dtcc-named-best-place-human
-150500389.html.
143. Each year, the HRC produces a list of "Best Places to Work" based on CEI
data. Best Places to Work 2012, HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN,
http://www.hrc.org/resources/entry/best-places-to-work-2012 (last visited Apr. 21,
2013).
144. See, e.g., Aetna Makes "Best Place to Work" List for LGBTs Eleventh Year in
a Row, AETNA NEws HUB, Nov. 29, 2012, http://newshub.aetna.com/press-
release/corporate-and-financial/aetna-makes-best-places-work-list-lgbts-eleventh-
year-row (reporting that executives are "'proud of the accomplishments Aetna has
made as an organization to advance diversity in its broadest sense and serve the
LGBT community as an employer and business partner'); PepsiCo Receives perfect
score on HRCs Corporate Equality Index for LGBT Employees and Their Families,
PEPSICO.COM, Nov. 27, 2012, http://www.pepsico.com/Story/PepsiCo-receives-
perfect-score-on-HRCs-Corporate-Equality-Index-for-LGBT-
employe11272012797.html (referring to the CEI as the "gold standard" for LGBT
employment policies).
145. Transgender Medical Treatment: Medically Necessary and Not Cosmetic,
HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN (Apr. 28, 2012),
http://www.hrc.org/resources/entry/transgender-medical-treatment-medically-
necessary-and-not-cosmetic.
146. Ending Stigma & Achieving Inclusion: HRC's Task Force to Address
Insurance Industry Practices, HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN,
http://www.hre.org/resources/entry/ending-stigma-achieving-full-inclusion-hrcs-
task-force-to-address-insurance (last visited Apr. 21, 2013) (endorsing WPATH
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care and precludes employers seeking Criterion 2c credit from
using different, possibly biased standards of medical necessity
review to deny coverage.
Finally, transgender-inclusive healthcare coverage won
through political processes has the potential to frame inclusive
coverage as the morally "right" choice. Compared to transition-
related benefits that materialize as a result of judicial
intervention, benefits that emerge electively in response to
political advocacy may have the beneficial effect of signaling
broader social acceptance." If political processes can convince
employers that public opinion about the importance of
transgender-inclusive care is shifting, employers may feel
increasingly compelled to follow these trends." Indeed, companies
that have publicaly adopted transgender-inclusive health benefits
tend to frame these decisions as evidence of their participation in
the next step for LGBT progress."' Because demands for
transgender-inclusive healthcare made through the political
process leave room for employers to reiterate their commitment to
equality by electing coverage, the political process may offer a
positive, popular framework that other institutional choices do
not.
2. The Structural Costs of the Political Process
Despite the benefits discussed above, the political process
works severe institutional costs on the struggle for transgender
healthcare equality. The biggest cost is that political processes
ultimately leave coverage for transition-related benefits up to the
goodwill of employers. This is so for several reasons. First, as a
matter of rhetoric, demands in the political process focus on
explaining inclusion as "important and economically attainable,"
standards). See SOC, supra note 5, at 34, 58-60 (detailing best practices).
147. See Diskin, supra note 17, at 161 (presenting political victories like San
Francisco's as a "double victory" for encouraging employers to think about
transition-related care as "good for business").
148. See id. at 161-62.
149. See., e.g., Chubb Offers Medical Benefits to Transgender Employees, CHUBB
GROUP OF INS. COMPANIES (Nov. 15, 2011),
http://www.chubb.com/corporate/chubbl4684.html; Google Announces Health
Benefits for Transgender US Employees, GLAAD (Nov. 22, 2011, 4:53 PM),
http://www.glaad.org/blog/google-announces-health-benefits-us-transgender-
employees; SEIU Passes Resolution Calling for Transgender-Inclusive Health
Insurance, NAT'L GAY & LESBIAN TASK FORCE BLOG (May 30, 2012),
http://thetaskforceblog.org/2012/05/30/seiu-passes-resolution-calling-for-
transgender-inclusive-health-insurance-coverage/.
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not on threatening exclusion as socially or fiscally unwise."s0
Second, as a matter of strategy, these demands seem more like
suggestions because the LGBT community has not historically
advocated for transgender rights. Since gay groups have tended to
view transgender people as outsiders, leaders have distanced
themselves from transgender-inclusive struggles out of fear that
"the sudden emergence of a transgender constituency demanding
inclusion in the gay movement might well appear to be a
destabilizing and potentially threatening element.""' Thus,
transgender-inclusive advocacy in these groups has been difficult
to achieve and, when it occurs, may appear strategically less
attractive. 15 2 In turn, employers may feel less compelled to act.
Relatedly, the second cost is that political processes may not
exert the same influence over all employers, leaving some
transgender employees without protection. While political
pressures cannot compel any employers to elect coverage, the
rhetoric of LGBT equality that has been somewhat successful in
gaining coverage from large corporations has not influenced, or at
least has not been documented to influence, smaller employers in a
similar manner.15' Arguably, smaller companies may eventually
follow the lead of larger, big-name corporations. But because
small- and medium-size employers face different health insurance
constraints than large employers do,'5 4 it is also possible that
political pressures will do little to compel smaller employers to act.
For instance, smaller employers may remain unresponsive to
political demands if they feel financially unable to offer more
benefits than the law requires, or if they do not feel that a
commitment to transgender-inclusive healthcare gives them any
particular edge over their competitors.' Even if leaving coverage
to the goodwill of employers constitutes an unfortunate but
150. HRC COVERAGE, supra note 120, at 3.
151. Shannon Minter, Do Transsexuals Dream of Gay Rights?, in TRANSGENDER
RIGHTS, supra note 14, at 153.
152. "Although usually unspoken, I believe some gay leaders also feel
resentment and fear that transgender people will co-opt or derail the hard-won
resources and political power that gay people have worked so long to achieve." Id.
153. Tellingly, the HRC states, "[Tihe more successful a business is in the
United States, the more likely it is to embrace equality." HUm. RTS. CAMPAIGN,
CORPORATE EQUALITY INDEX 2013: RATING AMERICAN WORKPLACES ON LESBIAN,
GAY, BISEXUAL AND TRANSGENDER EQUALITY 3 (2012), available at
http://asp.hrc.org/documents/CorporateEqualityIndex-2012.pdf.
154. For instance, most employers who offer coverage are self-insured, and the
option to self-insure is much more cost effective for large employers than it is for
small employers. Diskin, supra note 17, at 139.
155. See HRC COVERAGE, supra note 120, at 14.
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acceptable cost, the fact that the efficacy of inciting this goodwill
may diminish with employer size is cause for concern. Because
the right to affordable transition-related care does not depend on
an individual's employer size, strategies for securing this care
should not reflect this imbalance.
Even if one insists on the power of political influence at all
levels and accepts the institutional cost of waiting longer for
transition-related coverage from smaller employers,156 problematic
variations at legislative levels of the political process exacerbate
the advocacy imbalances discussed above. In particular, under the
ACA, small and large group employers face different regulatory
schemes with regard to health insurance exchanges."' Exchanges,
which must be operational in each state by 2014, are state-run
entities that "organiz [e] the health insurance marketplace to help
consumers and small businesses shop for coverage in a way that
permits easy comparison of available plan options based on price,
benefits and services, and quality.""' Beginning in 2014, all small
employers with 100 or fewer employees must have the option of
purchasing affordable health insurance through an exchange."'
These exchanges will remain closed to large employers with 100 or
more employees until 2017, when states will have the option to
include them.' This differential treatment based on size is
relevant to transgender health for two reasons. First, health
insurance policies offered through exchanges must cover "essential
health benefits."16' The Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS) will allow each state to select its own definition of
"essential health benefits" from a variety of the largest federal and
in-state plans in operation, which will allow states to select a
"definition that incorporates all existing state mandates."162
Because no state mandates coverage for all transition-related
care, 6' states are unlikely to consider these health benefits
156. Cf Spade et al., supra note 78, at 232 ("W]e need to strategize beyond a
notion that if we win rights for the most sympathetic and normal of our lot first,
the others will be protected in time. Instead, we should be concerned that the
breadth of our vision will determine the victories we obtain.").
157. Monahan, supra note 75, at 83-84.
158. Initial Guidance to States on Exchanges, HEALTHCARE.GOV,
http://www.healthcare.gov/law/resources/regulations/guidance-to-states-on-
exchanges.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2012).
159. See Monahan, supra note 75, at 88-89.
160. Id.
161. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300 gg-6 (2010).
162. Monahan, supra note 75, at 97.
163. Spade, supra note 13, at 500.
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"essential."
Secondly, Section 1557 of the ACA prohibits discrimination
on the basis of sex by any federally-assisted health program, any
health program administered by an executive agency, or any
entity established under Title I of the ACA.'64 In a promising
response to LGBT activist organizations urging" HHS to adopt a
definition of sex discrimination consistent with the holding in
Macy, the Department announced that "Section 1557's sex
discrimination prohibition extends to claims of discrimination
based on gender identity or failure to conform to stereotypical
notions of masculinity or femininity."1 66 When HHS subsequently
published this clarification on its website, however, the
Department explicitly stated without elaboration that it did not
consider exclusions for transition-related surgical procedures to
constitute discrimination on the basis of gender identity or sex
stereotyping.167 Although further guidance from the Department is
forthcoming,'" this unequivocal decision to separate transition-
related benefits from the concept of sex discrimination is unlikely
to change. Thus, state-run health exchanges-entities established
under Title I-have clear authority to offer policies that exclude
transition-related surgical procedures under Section 1557. In
sum, the regulatory differences between small- and large-group
insurance policies under the ACA have the potential to perpetuate
existing imbalances in political advocacy. Because small
employers may be least likely to elect coverage for socially
progressive reasons and because the ACA explicitly permits small
employers to elect exclusionary plans, political processes will likely
result in unbalanced efforts to secure transgender-inclusive
healthcare.
Lastly, political processes may fail to communicate the
164. § 1557, 42 U.S.C. § 18116 (2010).
165. Letter from LGBT Rts. Orgs. to Kathleen Sebelius, Sec'y, Dep't of Health &
Hum. Servs. (Jun. 5, 2012), available at
http://files.www.cmhnetwork.org/news/transgender-activists-hail-obamacare-
protections/102169763-June-6-LGBT-1557-Letter-to-HHS.pdf
166. Letter from Leon Rodriguez, Dir., Dep't of Health & Hum. Servs., to Maya
Rupert, Fed. Policy Dir., Nat'1 Ctr. for Lesbian Rts. (July 12, 2012), available at
http://www.scribd.com/doc/101981113/Response-on-LGBT-People-in-Se-1557-in-
the-Affordable-Care-Act-from-the-U-S-Dept-of-Health-and-Human-Services.
167. Questions and Answers on Section 1557 of the Affordable Care Act, U.S.
DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/civilrights/resources/laws/




complexities and nuances of transgender-inclusive healthcare. In
their letter to the HHS, LGBT advocacy organizations stressed
that "LGBT people face high levels of discrimination in the
provision of health services that has a substantial impact on
individual and public health."169 The letter did not enumerate
forms of healthcare discrimination, but the Department seems to
have sketched a rough line between what it will consider to be
discriminatory and what it will not. On its website dedicated to
Section 1557 clarifications, the Department refers to two
particular examples.170 The first is an instance of actionable
discrimination: individuals who are "not getting health care
because of how they look"17' can file a claim for discrimination for
failure to conform to stereotypical notions of masculinity or
femininity. The second is an instance of non-actionable
discrimination: a health insurer's refusal to cover transition-
related surgery, as mentioned above. This determination is
difficult to critique without further guidance. Suffice it to say that
political advocacy may successfully convey to legislators and
agencies how refusing to treat a transgender woman's broken arm
simply because of her transgender status is discriminatory.172
Conveying how excluding coverage for transition-related care is
discriminatory, on 'the other hand-which might require
explanations of medical necessity, rates of usage, individual and
employer costs, and much more-might prove too complex a
message for the political process."
3. The Costs and Benefits of Political Participation
For transgender healthcare coverage, the costs and benefits
of political participation generally mirror those in the market.
Employers interested in avoiding claim payments do not have to
invest significant resources in justifying their exclusions because
transgender individuals lack popular support and because most
people do not understand the medical necessity of transition-
169. Letter from LGBT Rts. Orgs., supra note 165.
170. Questions and Answers, supra note 167.
171. Id.
172. See NTDS, supra note 3, at 73.
173. Some transgender activist groups have focused on educating the public
about various forms of transgender discrimination by encouraging transgender
individuals to make their voices heard in the political process. See, e.g., NAT'L CTR.
FOR TRANSGENDER EQUAL., MAKE YOUR VOICE HEARD: A TRANSGENDER GUIDE TO




related care."' On the other hand, employees interested in
coverage have difficulty gaining political representation for similar
reasons. " However, in limited cases, political processes may
equalize participation by increasing benefits to employers and
decreasing costs to transgender employees. When political
pressures convince employers that they stand to gain more from
the social benefits of inclusion than the financial benefits of
exclusion,1 7 6 employers may be incentivized to elect coverage.
Similarly, when powerful actors in the political process act on
behalf of transgender employees, this advocacy may diminish the
costs of representing diffuse interests.1 77  In this way, when
employers are sensitive to political demands and political groups
are sensitive to transgender interests, the political process may
equalize institutional participation. Under these conditions,
comparative institutional analysis predicts that political processes
will produce better outcomes for transgender health than the
market.
C. The Courts: The Potential Future Model
1. Structural Benefits of the Judicial System
The principal institutional benefit of pursuing transgender-
inclusive healthcare through the courts is that transgender
individuals now have a clear statutory basis for alleging claims of
discrimination."' Because Macy held transgender discrimination
constituted unlawful discrimination on the basis of sex,17
transgender individuals who have suffered discrimination in
employment may sue their employer under Title VII of the Civil
174. See Hong, supra note 8, at 100.
175. Id.
176. DeCleene, supra note 77, at 141.
177. The informational costs are great.
Through the intensive educational and consultative efforts to address
health care and insurance disparities for the transgender population and
their families, including: outreach to leading health insurance companies,
direct consultation with both fully and self-insured employers to modify
their health care plans, and collection and dissemination of cost and
utilization data from leading businesses, the HRC Foundation led a five-
fold increase in the number of major U.S. employers affording
transgender-inclusive health care coverage, from 49 in the 2009 CEI to
more than 200 in the 2012 CEL.
HRC COVERAGE, supra note 140, at 3.
178. Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. VII, 78 Stat. 241, 253-66 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§2000e to 2000e-17); Macy v. Holder, 2012 WL 1435995 E.E.O.C. (2012).
179. Macy, 2012 WL 1435995 E.E.O.C. at *11 (2012).
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Rights Act of 1964. Given this recent development, transgender
employees who have been denied transition-related benefits under
exclusionary ESI plans may now have a viable path to legal
remedies. If successful, a legal challenge to an employer's
exclusion of transition-related coverage could help secure
transgender-inclusive benefits.
To illustrate what such a suit might look like, I will briefly
sketch out a claim of sex discrimination that a transgender
plaintiff might bring against an employer for excluding transition-
related coverage. Proceeding under a theory of disparate
treatment,o the plaintiff would first allege membership in a
protected class (sex) as per the holding in Macy. Next, the plaintiff
must allege his or her disqualification to receive benefits under an
ESI plan; this might involve, for instance, a showing of full-time
status. Third, the plaintiff must allege that he or she suffered an
adverse employment action from his or her employer. To satisfy
this element, the plaintiff might argue that he or she sought
coverage for a transition-related procedure, that his or her
employer denied coverage under an exclusion clause in the
relevant ESI plan, and that this denial of health insurance
benefits constituted an adverse employment action."' Finally, the
plaintiff must allege circumstances that give rise to an inference of
discriminatory intent. To this end, the plaintiff might produce
evidence demonstrating that only transgender individuals receive
diagnoses of gender dysphoria or receive transition-related care for
the purposes of treating diagnosed gender dysphoria. The plaintiff
might also produce evidence demonstrating that the type of care
transgender individuals receive for the treatment of gender
dysphoria is, in fact, regularly prescribed to cisgender individuals
for other diagnoses.18' Considering that the exclusion clause in the
ESI plan bars coverage for gender dysphoria (or some other
transgender-specific phrasing), the plaintiff would argue that
these circumstances demonstrate the employer's intent to
discriminate against plaintiff on the basis of transgender status.
180. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (laying out
elements of a plaintiffs prima facie case of disparate treatment within a burden-
shifting framework).
181. Denials of health insurance benefits have been held to constitute adverse
employment actions. See, e.g., Lewis v. K2 Industrial Servs., Inc., 2007 WL
3442189, at *6 (M.D. Ala. 2007); Sherman v. Dallas County Community College
Dist., 2010 WL 2293165, at *5 (N.D. Tex. 2010); Velasquez v. Frontier Medical Inc.
275 F. Supp. 2d 1253, 1281 (D.N.M. 2005).
182. See Khan, supra note 26, at 404-05.
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There are certainly numerous legal challenges to asserting
such a case. First, although statistical evidence is not required for
every type of employment discrimination claim, the lack thereof,
or the small size of the relevant data pool, may influence skeptical
members of a court.'" Any statistical evidence on the number of
private insurance denials, for instance, may be difficult to
obtain.'8  Even if this data were available, it might not evince
discrimination to a court if only a small number of transgender
employees from a company had actually sought coverage; a lack of
statistical evidence would likely preclude a class action lawsuit.
Second, a court might find that although some procedures
provided for gender dysphoria are provided to cisgender
individuals without exclusion, the fact that services for the
purpose of transition-related coverage are equally denied to
transgender and cisgender employees thwarts a finding of
discriminatory intent. An argument against medical necessity
would certainly arise as well, as I will discuss in further detail
below.
A second institutional benefit of pursuing coverage through
the courts is that, unlike the political process, the judicial system
theoretically has the skilled reasoning necessary to discern
subtler, more complex forms of discrimination."' Instead of
limiting its vision of anti-transgender discrimination to an explicit
refusal of healthcare for non-transition-related services, a court
might grasp the nuanced ways in which denial of certain benefits
wreaks discriminatory impact upon a group. Relatedly, a part of
this judicial competency theory is a commitment to political
neutrality. Although this commitment appears questionable
against a history of "confused hostility"" to transgender
populations, courts would at the very least face the professional
responsibility of justifying exclusions with some semblance of
logic.
Finally, securing coverage through the courts would probably
constitute a two-step process: a prohibition of discriminatory
183. Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339-40 (clarifying the
importance of statistical evidence in employment discrimination cases).
184. Hong, supra note 8, at 94-95 ("There is no 'paper trail' of alleged denials
because privately insured transsexuals are precluded from seeking remedies from
the courts.").
185. For instance, the legal system recognizes that both disparate treatment and
disparate impact constitute forms of illegal discrimination. Teamsters, 413 U.S. at
324.
186. Hong, supra note 8, at 93.
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exclusions at first and affirmative protections later on. While this
might in some ways reflect a limitation or cost, I believe that this
two-step process has several benefits. For one, the first step is
significantly easier than the second. Although a ban on exclusions
may prove inadequate in the long run, eliminating complete
employer immunity by refusing to protect these clauses as
bargained-for terms would be a huge step in the right direction. In
addition, because courts will understand that a prohibition of
exclusion does not constitute a mandate for coverage, judges wary
of overburdening employers with insurance liabilities may show
more willingness to see these practices as discriminatory.
2. Structural Costs of the Legal System
The most critical institutional cost of the judicial system is
the risk of an adverse ruling."' If courts hold that exclusions for
transition-related care under ESI plans do not constitute sex
discrimination under Title VII, employers who remain
unsympathetic to political pressures could continue to deny
coverage. Though unlikely, employers who have elected to offer
coverage could also rely on these holdings to rescind their previous
decisions. Although determinations upholding insurance
exclusions would not prohibit special interest groups from
continuing to advocate for elective coverage, adverse rulings would
severely undermine the future efficacy of these efforts.
Courts may uphold discriminatory exclusions on any number
of grounds, but judicial opposition to medical necessity and
deference to HHS's Section 1557 determination are two possible
sources of concern. Despite statements from the World
Professional Association for Transgender Health and
determinations by other courts, some courts have nevertheless
rejected transition-related care as medically unnecessary." While
future courts may continue to reiterate these myths, any court
that chooses to do so would have to confront and directly
contradict the authority of the American Medical Association
(AMA). In 2008, the AMA endorsed transition-related care as
medically necessary, effective care for the treatment of gender
187. Diskin, supra note 17, at 160 ("[A] judge might end up narrowly
interpreting the law and limiting access for the majority of transgender people in
need of basic care.").
188. See, e.g., Smith v. Rasmussen, 249 F.3d 755 (8th Cir. 2001); Mario v. P & C
Food Mrkts., Inc., 313 F.3d 758 (2d Cir. 2002).
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dysphoria.'" Moreover, the AMA resolved its support for public
and private insurance coverage of transition-related benefits, and
stated that denial of these benefits "represents discrimination
based solely on a patient's gender identity."" Arguably, even if
courts expressed willingness to accept the AMA's position, they
might nevertheless hesitate to prohibit insurance exclusions when
HHS has determined that such exclusions do not constitute sex
discrimination.191 HHS's judgment on this issue, however, would
not likely constrain a court. First, the agency's determination
about sex reassignment benefits only precludes a finding of
discrimination under Section 1557 of the ACA, so a finding of sex
discrimination under Title VII would not contradict this
determination. Second, even if courts looked to the Section 1557
stance for guidance, the fact that HHS has not yet provided any
rationale92 for its interpretation gives courts ample room to
disagree. Regardless, the concerns discussed here are not
exhaustive. Especially considering the limited but positive
developments in the political process, the cost of an unfavorable
ruling may be too high to risk.
A second cost of turning to the judicial system for
transgender-inclusive healthcare relates the ideological concerns
expressed at the beginning of this Note. As mentioned, some
critics contend that the medical community's psychological
diagnosis requirement to transition-related care pathologizes
transgender populations.' Additionally, critics have pointed out
that this pathologization tends to frame physical reassignments as
the exclusive treatment for a mental illness that all transgender
individuals are assumed to have.' As a result, transgender
identities under the law have become "medicalized"'" insofar as
courts have conditioned legitimacy upon the receipt of transition-
related care. The extent to which transgender individuals have
successfully obtained irreversible, biological changes to sex
189. Am. Med. Ass'n House of Delegates, supra note 6, at 1.
190. Id.
191. See Questions and Answers, supra note 167.
192. Literally, the website just says "No." Id.
193. See Butler, supra note 14, at 275.
194. Khan, supra note 4, at 386.
195. Id. at 408 ("Cases involving insurance privileges for transition-related
services all recount an almost identical and medically focused narrative."); Spade et
al., supra note 13, at 497 ("Trans people live at a complex crossroads-the law
defines us through medical norms by requiring medical evidence of our gender at
every turn, yet many laws and policies deny that our medical needs are real or that
the care we seek is legitimate.").
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characteristics is more likely to persuade courts about the validity
of transgender status than non-biological or biologically reversible
forms of transitioning. Courts have employed this discourse to
define-and, more frequently, to limit-the legal rights of
transgender individuals in various contexts, from marriage'96 to
parenting.197 Because courts are not likely to abandon this history
of medicalized obsession, the choice to seek transgender-inclusive
healthcare through litigation may come at the cost of perpetuating
problematic conceptions of gender variance.'" Indeed, this rhetoric
is not only inaccurate and invasive, but also in many ways
antithetical to broader visions of transgender autonomy and
equality.
3. The Costs and Benefits of Legal Participation
It is difficult to project the participation costs for employers
because very few employers have had to defend their exclusionary
policies in court. Under the protective shadow of private contract
law, the financial benefit of denying coverage for transgender-
specific claims will probably justify the costs of defending
exclusionary policies for employers. Similarly, the high costs of
litigation will probably outweigh the benefit of coverage for
individual employees if legal precedents are unfavorable. If courts
extend Title VII protections to transgender employees, however,
the cost of defending a policy as nondiscriminatory might exceed
the benefits retained from denying infrequent claims.
Alternatively, employers might reason that the risk of avoiding a
"flood" of transition-related claims justifies one-time litigation
costs. For transgender employees, the cost of educating judges
under favorable legal precedent will likely be worth the benefit of
winning coverage. Moreover, for some individual employees and
civil rights groups, social justice goals of eliminating facially
discriminatory workplace policies may easily justify litigation
196. In the Matter of the Estate of Gardiner, 42 P.3d 120 (Kan. 2002); Littleton
v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 222, 224 (Tx. App. 1999), Kantaras v. Kantaras, 884 So. 2d 155
(Fla. Cir. Ct. 2004); cf M.T. v. J.T., 355 A.2d 204, 206 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1976)
(upholding a transgender woman's marriage on the grounds that "her vagina had a
'good cosmetic appearance'" and had "a vagina and a labia which were 'adequate for
sexual intercourse'").
197. J.L.S. v. D.K.S., 943 S.W.2d 766 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997); Cisek v. Cisek, 1982
LEXIS 13335, at *4 (Ohio App. July 20, 1982); Daly v. Daly, 715 P.2d 56 (Nev.
1986); cf Christian v. Randall, 516 P.2d 132 (Colo. App. 1973).
198. Then again, "[mledicine clearly shapes the legal rights available to
transgender individuals, but legal assumptions about sex can influence medical





This Note examined the structural and agency costs of
pursuing transgender-inclusive healthcare through the market,
the political process, and the courts. Although the market has
clearly failed to remedy the exclusion of transition-related
coverage, the relative costs and benefits of political and legal
action may be more difficult to reconcile."' Careful consideration
of these alternatives remains crucial to effectuating systemic
changes. Ultimately, the present goal in applying a comparative
institutional analysis to this issue is not to conclusively decide
which course of action is best; rather, the point is that both acting
and not acting, or acting in certain ways as opposed to others
implicates a choice with distinct consequences. It is not enough,
for instance, to argue against bringing a legal suit to enforce
nondiscriminatory coverage out of fear of an adverse ruling
without also considering the current and continuing sacrifices
borne by transgender employees in the absence of litigation.
As evidenced by recent public health legislation, "health
insurance plans ... have evolved from functioning primarily as
risk spreading devices to operating mainly as cost spreading
vehicles."2 0 0 The question of insurability thus depends not only on
the risk of illness, "but also on whether treating the condition
serves a socially beneficial purpose important enough to mandate
insurance coverage of the treatment."O' Ultimately, the struggle
for transgender rights hinges on communicating as "socially
beneficial" the right "of all people to determine and express our
gender, sexuality, and reproduction."202 The institutional capacity
to allow and honor gender transgressions is integral to individual
transgender rights, and critical to expanding our rigid conceptions
of gender that operate to police all members of our society.203 At
this juncture, a comparative institutional analysis may shed light
on the most effective way to achieve these goals.
199. See Hong, supra note 8.
200. Khan, supra note 4, at 390.
201. Id.
202. Spade, supra note 78, at 218.
203. Spade, supra note 101.
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